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Paul R. Commerford President and C.E.O.
LawDATA, Inc.
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Mr. Commerford has been active in the
valuation of pensions and the preparation of Domestic
Relations Orders for his attorney clients since the
founding of LawDATA, Inc. in 1984. He has presented
Continuing Legal Education Sessions dealing with the
valuation and distribution of retirement assets incident to
divorce cases for State Bar Associations throughout the
country and written many articles on the subject for legal
publications.
If you have any questions or ideas for
upcoming articles you can reach Paul Commerford at
paul@lawdatainc.com.
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the experts at LawDATA, Inc. draft model property settlement language that deals specifically
with the pension plan to which the order is addressed
and the facts of your case. |
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The Divorce, Pensions and Retirement Benefits
Newsletter is published by: www.divorcenet.com
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THE QDRO GAMBLE (Part One)
A
lot of things can happen between the time a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order is entered and the time it actually goes into
pay status. How can attorneys advise their clients about the
many unanticipated situations that can completely change the
nature of the benefit for which they thought they had been
negotiating if they are unaware of even the basics of pensions.
In some states, because of really bad case law, a QDRO should
be used only as a last resort and the client should be fully
aware of that fact. Yet the truth is few attorneys properly
advise their clients of potential QDRO hazards or insert into
the settlement agreement language that can mitigate many of
them. For the next couple of months we are going to look at
some of the problems that use of a QDRO as the retirement benefit
settlement tool can create for both the client and the attorney.
In some cases these problems are out of the control of the
attorney but if the client (who is relying on the expertise
of the attorney) is not made aware of these potential hazards
it will be the attorney who will be blamed for the fact that
the client did not get what he or she anticipated. This month
we are going to look at the effects of inflation on an equitable
settlement. See below to learn more about the
unintended consequences that a QDRO can present.
Tip of the Month:
AN OLDIE BUT GOODIE!
The
easiest way for an attorney to fall into the QDRO malpractice
trap if they represent the alternate payee is to fail to negotiate
the responsibility for the preparation of the order.
If you represent the alternate payee it is your responsibility
to protect your client and insure that the QDRO that is filed
reflects the agreement as negotiated. In the preparation of a
QDRO there are always issues that must be addressed that weren’t
covered in the negotiation but which, if not properly worded,
could have a negative impact on the terms of the settlement.
Rarely do these issues become “after the fact” problems
because their inclusion is usually considered fair and part of
the settlement. For example, the alternate payee’s share
of post-retirement across-the-board passive benefit improvements
(COLA’s, renegotiated union contracts affecting retirees,
etc.) often will not be paid to the alternate payee unless specified
in the order. If you don’t write the order you might not
even think of their existence, much less take issue with your
opposing counsel when no mention of them is made. But your client
will certainly learn of them sooner or later and you will be
blamed for their absence. That is just one example of the many
things that can be overlooked if you do not prepare the order.
If you represent the alternate payee you have the duty of insuring
that an order is drafted and that the client receives every component
of the benefit normally paid to an alternate payee. There is
no sense of responsibility on the part of your opposing counsel
to your client and certainly no sense of urgency. If the participant
dies or leaves employment prior to the submission of an order
(though not necessarily the approval of the order) your client
might get nothing.
Feature Article:
THE QDRO GAMBLE- (PART ONE)
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The Inflation Nightmare - We still see settlement language
that awards the alternate payee “50%
of the accrued monthly pension benefit” on the marital
property cut-off date. This means exactly what it says. The alternate
payee’s share of the benefit will not increase one cent
between the cut-off date and the date it goes into pay status.
Traditional pensions (defined benefit plans) do not have any
provisions for paying interest or adjusting the monthly income
because there is not an individual investment account backing
up the pension income. Pensions are promises to pay a future
monthly income based on a formula and backed up by a large investment
account based on the actuarially determined amounts needed to
fund pension benefits to all the employee participants. Once
the alternate payee’s share is defined using the previous
language that is all that will be paid.
In some
states this is the best you can do (see more later) but we
see this in states that do allow for an equitable pension
distribution. The award should be “50% of the marital portion
of the gross monthly benefit paid at the time the pension goes
into pay status”. The marital portion is defined as a percentage
determined by dividing the total number of months married while
employed by the total number of months of employment at the time
the benefit begins being paid. To illustrate the difference,
if a couple were married 20 years and on the cut-off date the
participant had an accrued pension benefit of $1,000.00 per month
payable at age 65 the alternate payee would get $500.00 per month
when the participant reached his normal retirement age, 65. Assume
each party is 45 years of age on the marital property cut-off
date. For the purpose of this example we will forget about the
fact that the plan might have supplemented, early unreduced benefits
and assume retirement commences at age 65. To keep it simple
we will also assume that the alternate payee was also awarded
her share of the joint and survivor benefits but limited to the
same amount as she would receive if the participant had not predeceased
($500.00 per month). We only want to isolate the effect of inflation
on the settlement.
Assuming
a 3% annual inflation, the portion of the actual pension paid
to the participant after retiring at age 65, based on the
first 20 years of employment, the marital portion, will be $903.06
per month. The alternate payee’s share stays at $500.00.
Based on historical inflation factors, it is probably more realistic
to assume an average inflation rate of 6% over the 20 years between
the cut-off date and retirement. In that case the participant
would receive $1,603.57 per month as the marital share while
the alternate payee still only gets $500.00 per month. This is
because pensions are based on a formula that uses the highest
average salaries to calculate the participant’s benefit
at the time of retirement. This automatically adjusts the accrued
pension income for inflation as salary increases generally reflect
cost of living increases, unless the employee is on a fast track
moving up the management ladder. The participant’s total
pension is unjustly increased by $1,103.57 per month, using the
6% assumption, with dollars that really should go to the alternate
payee as they were earned during the marriage and should be part
if the alternate payee’s 50% marital share.
From the
previous, you can see how it is possible to structure a totally
inequitable distribution while on the surface it appears
that the employee’s pension was fairly distributed. If
your state permits otherwise, never use language that awards “50%
of the accrued monthly pension” on the marital property
cut-off date. If the correct language was used each party would
get the same amount of monthly income for the portion of the
pension attributable to the marital period.
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Addressing State Statute/Case Law Problems - If
you practice in a state that only permits distribution of
the accrued benefit
determined on the marital property cut-off date (PA, FL, IN,
NC, SC, etc.) then, as you can see from the above example, use
of a QDRO guarantees an inequitable distribution. Of course,
if the participant wants to be reasonable there is nothing in
the law to prevent structuring an equitable QDRO but as we all
know “reasonable” is more often than not a missing
factor in the divorce process. You will have to be creative to
salvage some equity for your client if you are locked into an
unfair settlement by statute and/or case law in your state.
One way
to protect the alternate payee is to use an immediate offset
of property (i.e., a bigger share of the home equity to
offset the present value of the pension) combined with making
the alternate payee the sole beneficiary of the pension plan’s
pre and post retirement survivor annuity. The participant’s
gross pension will have to be reduced by about 10% to fund this
benefit but that is exactly the pension that would have been
paid if the parties had not divorced so in a way the participant
is not giving away anything. You will have to draft a QDRO to
lock in this provision.
If the alternate
payee is female, and better still younger than the participant,
actuarially, she has an excellent chance
of reaping the rewards of this option and will be paid the survivor
benefits with dollars having the same purchasing power as the
dollars that would have been paid to the participant. Even if
the alternate payee has to take less than 50% of the present
value of the pension, this is still a better settlement than
using a QDRO to distribute the pension using the provisions required
in your state. If the parties do not have enough marital assets
to make the offset, consider structuring an amortized payment
(using a realistic interest rate) over as many years is necessary
(based on the participant’s disposable income) to reimburse
the alternate payee for the portion of the present value of the
pension that is awarded. This can be an attractive alternative
to all involved. With alimony practically dead and buried in
many states, additional income following the divorce can be very
attractive to the non-participant spouse.
Unless the participant is contemplating an immediate remarriage,
giving away the survivorship benefit after he or she dies can
be very palatable. Deep down, everybody thinks they are immortal
or at the very least that they will outlive their ex-spouse.
Because of this many participants sincerely doubt that their
ex will see a dime. So, in their mind they are not giving away
anything.
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